TRACER: Trace-Regularized Training Against Indirect Prompt Injection
Kshitij Mishra, Salem Lahlou, Nils Lukas
Abstract
Indirect prompt injection uses untrusted retrieved content, tool outputs, or agent messages to override an LLM's intended behavior. We show that defense robustness is channel-conditioned: the same attack succeeds 18% of the time as a follow-up message but 53% when placed in retrieved context. We propose TRACER (Trace-Regularized Adversarial Channel Exposure with Reward-shaping), a channel-aware adversarial training method that samples presentation wrappers and combines an answer-anchored, evidence-gated reward with ATRC, which aligns attacked reasoning with clean evidence when an injection is invalid. On GSM8K with Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct, TRACER reduces RAG-framed ASR from 65.5% to 6.1% while preserving 78-82% clean accuracy. Joint RAG+tool training achieves 13.9% average ASR across framings at 3B scale, while a single epoch at 7B reaches 9.4%. These results demonstrate that robust defenses must explicitly train and evaluate across deployment channels.