On the Boundary of Admission Gates: An Injected-Truth Study of Falsification-First Selection in Quantitative Strategy Research
Tianlun Zheng
Abstract
Strategy research conflates two problems: finding a profitable rule, and establishing that the finding is not search luck. The latter calls for admission gates -- statistical criteria that must be satisfied before a conclusion is adopted -- yet whether gates work, and at what cost, remains untested. We introduce an injected-truth protocol with a random-admission control that adopts at the same rate as the gate; only if the gate beats this control does it carry information rather than merely raise a threshold. Across synthetic and real-calibrated panels, gates eliminate false discoveries in the weak-signal regime but cut adoption to 1--7%, and add nothing when signals are strong. Most importantly, criteria computed on absolute rather than excess returns silently reject every candidate, including true signals. Keywords: multiple testing, backtest overfitting, strategy admission, injected-truth validation, excess returns, false discovery rate