Parallelism or Concession? Concurrency-Aware Procurement Negotiation for Agentic Commerce
Xiaolin Xu, Donghao Zhu
Abstract
Agentic buyers can cheaply fork a procurement task into many parallel negotiations, but concurrency is not free: every thread consumes resources, and simultaneous agreements create cancellation and commitment risk. We study a one-unit post-order sourcing problem with a single hard-deadline negotiation window, in which a planner jointly chooses the number of seller-facing negotiators and a common procurement price cap. The model combines a product-specific acceptance curve with fulfillment loss, per-thread cost, and excess-commitment cost. We establish three structural results. First, holding the per-thread acceptance target fixed, the marginal value of another negotiator decays geometrically, yielding a conditional concurrency threshold. Second, under a convex quantile curve, parallelism substitutes for concession: more concurrent negotiators imply a weakly lower per-thread acceptance target and price cap. Third, when prices are more dispersed, Agentic buyers benefit by searching harder for bargains, but suffer when they instead try to guarantee procurement by offering higher prices. We operationalize these results in the Concurrency-Aware Negotiation Optimizer (CANO), a deterministic optimizer that jointly determines the optimal negotiation concurrency and procurement price cap for an agentic procurement system. Across different analytic market configurations and extensive Monte Carlo, finite-data, non-Gaussian, and correlated-seller stress tests, CANO consistently outperforms common heuristic policies while validating the predicted structural properties.