Compact Vision Models for Iris Presentation Attack Detection under Presentation Attack Instrument Shift and Environmental Degradation
Athanasios Angelakis, Marta Gomez-Barrero
Abstract
Iris presentation attack detection (PAD) is security-critical when a subsystem that appears reliable during development encounters presentation attack instruments (PAIs) or acquisition conditions absent from validation data. We benchmark three compact scratch-trained computer-vision models, each with at most approximately 0.26 million trainable parameters, on the Notre Dame subset of LivDet-Iris 2017 under PAI-driven domain shift and environmental degradation. All models are trained without external pretraining or data augmentation and evaluated over five seeds. A validation-selected threshold is transferred unchanged to the known-attack, unknown-attack, corrupted, and pooled test partitions. From known to unknown attack presentations, Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER) increases by 17.11-30.47 percentage points and Detection Equal Error Rate (D-EER) increases by 7.38-12.73 percentage points. At the validation-selected threshold, ZACH-ViT obtains the lowest unknown-attack APCER (47.69 +/- 4.84%) and D-EER (38.87 +/- 0.93%), while Compact-TransMIL obtains the lowest Bona Fide Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER). ZACH-ViT also gives the lowest unknown-attack BPCER at an APCER limit of 10% (81.29 +/- 1.95%). The high absolute errors show that the comparative advantage of the best compact model does not constitute deployment readiness under unknown PAIs.