When Does Information Sharing Improve Decentralized Discovery? Aggregation, Independent Rescue, and Equilibrium Selection
Yohei Nakajima
Abstract
Information sharing can improve a pooled estimate while eliminating independent rescue actions. This paper separates those effects in exact finite discovery models. A centralized action-budget profile shows that equal one-person accuracy can coexist with different portfolio values. Under a registered incremental-sharing protocol, a sharing step improves discovery exactly when pooled residual error contracts faster than an independent rescue attempt. Exact bounded registries exhibit compression, aggregation, neutral curves, and a bounded zero mixed class. In a two-agent Bayesian game with a hidden mixture of common and independent signal sources, the registered selected equilibrium yields a strict positive sharing interval at signal accuracy 3/5, while alternative equilibria show that the result is selection-dependent rather than universal. The models are synthetic and finite; no human or organizational data are used.